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Abstract 
Suppose we wanted to create an intelligent 
machine that somehow drew its intelligence 
from large collections of text, possibly 
involving the processing of collections 
available on the Web such as Wikipedia. 
Does past research in deception offer a 
sufficiently robust basis upon which we 
might develop a means to filter out texts that 
are deceptive, either partially or entirely? 
Could we identify, for example, any 
deliberately deceptive edits to Wikipedia 
without consulting the edit history? In this 
paper, we offer a critical review of deception 
research. We suggest that there are a range of 
inconsistencies, contradictions, and other 
difficulties in recent deception research, and 
identify how we might begin to address 
deception research in a more systematic 
manner. 
1 Introduction 
Deception exists in various forms, and there can 
be acceptance in society of deceits of various 
kinds - typically geared towards personal gain 
(self-deception) or protection from harm. Often 
termed “white lies”, these differ significantly 
from those likely to be of a more harmful nature 
(“black lies”) – and here we would include the 
misrepresentation of science and the 
misrepresentation as science; the latter is 
prevalent in, for example, the advertising of 
cosmetic products. It remains difficult to discern, 
however, whether the portrayal by an apparently 
trusted media outlet of a reported survey of 200 
students’ responses to a question of whether they 
thought they had hallucinated after drinking 
coffee fits the former or the latter when 
characterized by the BBC as “'Visions link' to 
coffee intake”. Could we rely on existing 
deception research to enable us to distinguish 
amongst the presentation of such things on the 
Web? 
In this paper, we present a critical review of 
deception research, seeking to answer the 
questions outlined above. We first explain our 
preferred definition of deception, to disentangle 
deceptions from lies, and then clarify the impact 
that selection of a specific medium (text) has on 
the likely nature of deception. We then review 
the features that researchers tend to focus on as 
“cues” that might be used for detecting 
deception, focus these down to a set as may be 
detectable in text, and then demonstrate that in 
treatments of such cues by leading deception 
researchers there are various inconsistencies, 
contradictions, and other difficulties. We further 
consider how we might begin to address these 
difficulties, such that a more systematic approach 
might emerge from this research, and what future 
work might emerge.  
2 Defining Deception 
To understand deception, it is important to 
establish what we mean by it. Out of various 
definitions for deception, (e.g. Masip, Garrido & 
Herrero, 2004; Hall & Pritchard, 1996; Russow, 
1986), we settle on Mahon (2007): 
 
“To intentionally cause another person to 
have or continue to have a false belief that is 
truly believed to be false by the person 
intentionally causing the false belief by 
bringing about evidence on the basis of which 
  
the other person has or continues to have that 
false belief.” 
 
This particular definition leads with intent, 
which offers contrast with unintended actions as 
might lead to deception, and also allows us to 
distinguish from the ill-informed (e.g. believing 
the Earth is flat, the centre of the Universe, and 
so on). This also covers a deception occurring 
through a variety of actions or inactions. Some 
researchers equate lies with deceptions and have 
a tendency to use both terms interchangeably 
(Ekman; 1985; Vrij, 2000); we consider lies to be 
a specialized subgroup of deception and again 
highlight Mahon (2008): 
 
“… to make a believed-false statement with 
the intention that that statement be believed to 
be true”. 
 
Hence, lies have an essentially narrow scope 
to specific false statements. For example, 
deliberately pointing the wrong way without 
saying which way to go would be a deception, 
but only becomes a lie through a speech act. 
Being “very economical in his information” and 
hence concealing the truth leads to a deception 
but not a lie.  
Given these differences between deception 
and lies, it then becomes interesting to see how 
actions and statements can be constructed in 
order to bring about such “false beliefs”.  
3 Structure and Media  
Just like any other human interaction, deceptive 
behaviour can be divided into two main groups: 
planned and unplanned. In planned interactions, 
people have time to think, reflect and compare 
situations with past experiences. They know or 
have time to consider knowing the person who 
they interact with (DePaulo, 2003). In unplanned 
interactions, people are not necessarily aware of 
actions that will happen which might need to be 
controlled. They are not fully aware of the person 
they will interact with and cannot guarantee the 
outcomes. Planned deceits should be harder to 
detect simply because the deceivers have time to 
rehearse their words and behaviours in order to 
present the impression of being truthful, or at 
least being more compelling.  
Moreover, the choice of medium for 
communication can force the type of interaction. 
Based on Hancock, Thom-Santelli & Ritchie, 
2004), deceptiveness in media relates to three 
main elements:  
 Synchronicity: to what extent the 
medium provides real-time 
communication. 
 Distribution: whether the people who 
are communicating are in the same 
physical location or not. 
 Recordability: to what extent the 
medium is automatically recordable. 
By knowing these, it is possible to argue that 
synchronicity and unplanned interactions are 
directly related, so media that are synchronous 
should be avoided for planned deceits as they 
give opportunity to discuss whilst deceivers 
might need time to rehearse their answers so will 
prefer asynchronous communication – for 
example, email.  
If we focus on running text as the medium for 
deception, then while synchronicity and 
distribution are variable, recordability is certain. 
This will mean that most of the deceits can be 
planned well in advance, which could well make 
their detection somewhat more challenging. On 
the other hand, social media tends to assume 
greater degrees of synchronicity and a notionally 
lower distribution, so deceptions in social media 
may be more prevalent, not least because there 
can be less opportunity for planning. The next 
question, then, is what might be detectable. This 
brings us to the notion of deception “cues”. 
4 Deception Detection Cues  
Possibilities of being able to formulate human 
deception processes have encouraged experts in 
many fields such as psychology, sociology, 
criminology, philosophy and anthropology to 
study such behaviour and look for cues as might 
indicate it. Researchers have shown that telling a 
lie or being engaged in deceptive behaviour is 
mentally, emotionally and physically more 
challenging than being truthful (Miller & Stiff, 
1993; Zuckerman et al., 1981; Vrij, Edward, & 
Bull, 2001). It is emotionally challenging 
because deceivers might experience Fear and 
Threat (of being caught), Guilt and Shame (of 
deceiving someone and of having their trust 
questioned) or even Duping Delight (joy of 
deceiving someone). It is mentally challenging as 
deceivers need to create a story that is believable 
and consistent and try to remember what they are 
saying just in case they are questioned later 
  
(Miller & Stiff, 1993; Vrij, 2000; Zuckerman et 
al., 1981; Cody, Marston & Foster, 1984; Vrij, 
Edward & Bull, 2001). It is physically 
challenging as deceivers usually attempt to 
control the physical signs of their deceptive 
behaviour (Buller & Burgoon 1996; Vrij & 
Mann, 2004). These attempts can give away a 
deception or a lie as it is not easy to hide 
nervousness and fear/guilt, remember lies in 
detail, and try to manage all of these to make an 
honest impression at the same time. These will 
result in behaviours which would be different 
from truthful actions, giving Cues of Deception.  
In principle, almost any aspect of human 
existence that is involved in any action and 
behaviour may be carrying a cue to flag up 
deception; that can be eye movement, choice of 
words, arm positions or motions, and much 
more. One or many of these may be involved in a 
single communication, but some will be more 
specific to certain types of communication. For 
example, body language and eye movements are 
mainly considered in synchronous, non-
distributed communication, while the structure of 
the sentence will be more apparent in recordable, 
distributed communication such as IMs and 
emails. Such cues can be readily grouped by the 
3Vs:  
Visual (Non-verbal): any physical behaviour; 
reactions, movements, etc in three main groups 
of Body Acts, Postures and Face. 
Vocal: elements that accompany verbal 
communication with two main features involved: 
Nature of voice (e.g. Tone/ Tension, Pitch) and 
Rhythm (e.g. number and the length of pauses). 
Verbal: anything said or written (e.g. wording 
and structure). 
However, it is important to note that the 
physical signs, the visual and vocal, cannot 
entirely be trusted since specific conditions may 
lead to similar effects. In certain circumstances, 
people will be naturally nervous or may feel fear 
simply because of a situation. For example, in an 
interview, and in particular in interviews with 
law enforcement officers, a cue to deception may 
be out of the normal for that interaction, whilst 
all parts of the interaction could indicate 
deception in contrast to everyday interactions 
(Navarro, 2008). 
With our interest in detecting deception in 
text, we focus towards Verbal and in particular 
Written. Here, the deceiver must make words and 
patterns of those words do the work, and there is 
some expectation that this leads to different word 
usage and language patterns from those that 
might be considered, somehow, normal.  
5 Verbal Deception Detection Cues  
Three main types can be defined for verbal 
deception: 
 Spoken (e.g. face-to-face, audio and 
video recordings) 
 Written (e.g. blogs, emails, testimonies, 
academic articles) 
 Transcripts of spoken (phonetic 
transcription, orthographic transcription) 
However, recordings of speech will retain 
vocal elements which may offer cues, and 
transcripts may offer surrogates for pauses and 
retain the speech disfluencies (“ums”, “ahs”, 
“like”, and so on). Written text, then, is possibly 
hardest to treat as the visual and vocal cues are 
missing in contrast to spoken and transcripts 
(Gupta & Skillicorn, 2006). Interestingly, this 
suggests that Web content could offer ready 
source material but with the significant challenge 
in terms of detecting deception in it as the 
deceiving authors of written content will have the 
opportunity to plan. 
Many researchers have investigated the 
lexical, syntactic, and meta-content features of 
verbal deception, classifying pattern changes into 
three main dimensions: (1) Quantity; (2) Quality; 
and (3) Overall impression. Quantity changes 
relate to the number of words being used. Quality 
change focuses on the difference between the 
word choices but still on a quantitative basis. 
However, Overall Impression is based on human 
judgment from deceivers’ verbalizations 
including such elements as friendliness, sounding 
helpful, serious, uncertain, and so on (DePaulo et 
al. 2003). We discard these cues due to reasons 
of subjective interpretation - judges (detectors) 
would need to be trained, and while something 
seems believable and helpful to one, it may not 
appear the same to others, and exploring inter-
annotator agreement would become a distraction. 
We focus only on existing measurable cues that 
should be independent of a judge’s training and 
so could be used by both humans and machines.  
For Quantity and Quality measurements there 
are various hypotheses, different lists of cues, 
and even different expected changes. We have 
focussed more on studies where ideas have 
gained traction through adoption (citation and 
derivative exploration) by others. For example, 
  
Pennebaker’s research has been adapted based on 
its style (word-by-word), accuracy and flexibility 
for both written and spoken text (e.g. Toma & 
Hancock, 2010; Little & Skillicorn, 2008; Gupta 
and Skillicorn, 2006; Newman et al. 2003). 
5.1 Generalized Cues  
DePaulo et al. (2003) developed a list of 158 
visual, verbal and vocal deception cues, extracted 
from an analysis of 116 research papers between 
1920 and 2001. From this list, we consider just 
25 cues to relate to verbal and to be measurable, 
and these relate to just 10 research papers over 
that period. The cues include: Response length, 
Talking time, Cognitive complexity, Unique 
words, Generalising terms, Self-references, 
Mutual and group and other references, Word 
and phrase repetitions, Negative statements and 
complaints, and Extreme descriptions. As we 
will show, research since 2001 picks up on 
several of these cues, and we have been able to 
use DePaulo’s coding system to cross-reference 
subsequent papers for our own purposes.   
5.2 Frequency-based Cues  
A number of researchers appear to make use of 
Pennebaker’s Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC) system to support their experiments and 
claims (e.g. Gupta & Skillicorn, 2006; Hancock 
et al., 2004; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005a, b, c). 
They mention that the cues defining deception 
according to Pennebaker involve: 
Self-references: Using first-person singular 
(e.g. me, I and my) shows speaker ownership of 
a specific statement or event. This offers a link 
between the reality and the speaker, and as 
deceivers haven’t experienced that link they will 
reduce the use of self-references. 
Negative words: Emotions such as guilt, 
shame and fear may be attributed to the 
deceivers’ discomfort (DePaulo et al., 2003) and 
the effect of negative emotions on the pattern of 
language is believed to lead to an increase in the 
use of negative words. 
Cognitive complexity: As suggested earlier, 
cognitive complexity increases while deceiving. 
These effects become apparent in statements in 
various ways, which directly affects the structure 
of the text by changes in two main categories. (a) 
Exclusive words: Statements grounded in reality 
are more likely to highlight the details, including 
what happened and related reactions. Deceivers, 
lacking these details, use fewer exclusive words 
such as except, but, without and exclude. (b) 
Motion/action verbs: A decrease in exclusive 
words can result in an increase in action verbs 
(e.g. go, lead, walk) while trying to sound more 
assuring and convince others to take actions 
based on their words. Moreover, cognitively, it is 
easier to use simple and concrete actions in 
stating false stories compared to fake evaluations 
and retaining details.  
However, we have so far found little evidence 
that Pennebaker has proposed cues for deception 
except for one research paper by Newman, 
Pennebaker, Bery & Richards (Newman et al., 
2003). In that paper, the authors discuss cues 
previously offered by others (that relate to 
categories in LIWC) along with the reduction in 
the number of 3
rd
 person pronouns, which 
contradicts previous studies such as Knapp et al., 
(1974). Subsequent authors have referenced such 
articles ambiguously, which may give the 
impression that LIWC itself offers the answer, 
for example, Hancock et al., (2004):  
 
“[LIWC] was used to create empirically 
derived statistical profiles of deceptive and 
truthful communications (Pennebaker et al., 
2003),…” 
 
and Gupta & Skillicorn (2006): 
 
“Pennebaker et al. have constructed a 
model (LIWC) (Newman et al., 2003; 
Pennebaker, Francis & Booth, 2001) for 
deception based on the frequencies of 
various classes of words.” 
 
Whilst LIWC can offer analysis of data, when 
it comes to understanding the behaviours of cues 
as might indicate deception by “increase” or 
“decrease” in frequency, there is no clear 
baseline. So, to be able to detect any deception, 
work would first need to be done in order to (1) 
establish the frequency ranges for different 
elements within a specific collection, (2) set 
thresholds of deception per-collection and per 
cue, and then (3) manually verify those above 
and below the deception threshold. Relationship 
to some collection-specific average is unlikely to 
readily produce appropriate results. 
5.3 Category-based Cues  
Burgoon and colleagues have categorized 
deception cues. However, Burgoon and other 
researchers have, without much explanation that 
we can find, varied the number of categories and 
  
also reported cues in different categories in 
different research papers (Burgoon & Qin, 2006; 
Qin et al. 2005; Qin, Burgoon & Nunamaker, 
2004; Zhou et al. 2004; Zhou, Burgoon & 
Twitchell, 2003; Zhou et al. 2003; Burgoon et al. 
2003). Indeed, they appear to add, delete, or 
otherwise emphasise different cues throughout 
their work. Neither the cues nor the threshold 
related to their deceptiveness appear stable. A set 
of cues that have been moved around categories 
is represented by Black cells in Table 1. Table 1 
also shows, in gray, certain inconsistencies 
amongst these researchers: in Zhou et al. (2004), 
the number of words, sentences and the 
emotiveness index show an increase in cases of 
deception, but in Burgoon et al. (2003) and Zhou 
et al. (2003) all three are shown to decrease.  
Burgoon and colleagues are not alone in 
offering a categorization; Pennebakers’ LIWC 
categories would be related, modulo 
terminological and category variation. However, 
indications of expected values for such cues 
remain elusive and we only have information that 
some may rise whilst others may fall. 
Cues (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Word ** Q +** Q +** Q -** Q -** Q 
Sentence ** Q +** Q +** Q -** Q -** Q 
Modifiers -** U +** U ** Q ** Q -- -- 
First-person singular  -- -- -** V +** V -** V -- -- 
2nd person pronouns -- -- -** U ** V -- -- -- -- 
3rd person pronouns -- -- ** V -- -- 
Temporal details ** S +** S -- -- -** S -- -- 
Spatial details ** S -- -- -- -- 
Perceptual information -- -- +** S -- -- -** S -- -- 
Affective terms  ** A -- -- -- -- -- -- -** S 
Positive -- -- +** S +** A -** S -- -- 
Negative -- -- +** S +** A +** S -- -- 
Emotiveness index  -- -- +** E -- -- +** E -** S 
Lexical diversity  -** D -** D -** D -** D -- -- 
Redundancy  -** D -** D ** D +** D -- -- 
Passive voice ** V + ** V ** V + ** V -- -- 
Modal verbs -** U +** U ** V +** V -- -- 
Uncertainty +*** -- -** U ** V +** V -- -- 
Objectification -- -- -** V +** V ** V -- -- 
Typo errors -*** -- +** I +** I +** I -- -- 
Quantity = Q; Complexity = C; Specificity = S; Affect = A; Activation /Expressiveness = E; Diversity = D; 
Verbal non-immediacy = V; Informality = I; Uncertainty = U; Vocabulary Complexity = VC; Grammatical 
Complexity = GC;  
(1) Qin et al. 2005 (2) Zhou et al. 2004 (3) Zhou, Burgoon & Twitchell, 2003 (4) Zhou et al. 2003 (5) Burgoon 
et al. 2003 
Gray= inconsistency in expected results; in Black= inconsistency in categories  
[**] included, [***] mentioned but not highlighted 
 
Table 1: Contradictions in Cues and Expectation 
 
5.4 Evaluating the Cues  
Despite commonalities in what can be and is 
being studied amongst DePaulo, Pennebaker and 
Burgoon, it is apparent that there is not yet a 
clear set of cues with predefined expected values 
that could be used for detecting verbal deception. 
However, without clear descriptions of how to 
interpret results it is also possible that results 
could have been misreported. To address this, we 
undertook a number of small experiments – 
mainly geared around repetition of previous 
reported experiments – to try to understand the 
behaviour of deception cues. 
Our experiments involve analysis of the BBC 
article “'Visions link' to coffee intake” mentioned 
previously (BBC, 2009) with cues identified by 
Pennebaker, Mehl, and Niederhoffer, 2003), tests 
on academic work (we used 100 scientific 
abstracts
1
, which we have no reason to believe 
are deceptive), and attempting to repeat an 
analysis of the Enron email corpus including the 
                                                        
1 MuchMore Springer Bilingual Corpus, Available at: 
http://muchmore.dfki.de/resources1.htm  
  
emails of the executives (Keila, and Skillicorn, 
2005a, b, c). The latter of these is made all the 
more difficult by offering three differing 
numbers of emails for the analysis without 
details of how to obtain such a number from the 
full collection. Unfortunately, experiments all 
tended to support the idea that it would be hard 
to detect deception “in the wild” reliably, in part 
because deceptive texts may “hide” amongst 
non-deceptive. We can see how this might 
happen with a simple experiment using the 
online version of LIWC. We use the 7 LIWC 
categories, scaled by the maximum of each, for 
the 100 texts from the MuchMore Springer 
corpus. We then select the closest matching text 
(Nearest) from the first 10 to the coffee article 
(Coffee), and note that values for 5 of these 7 are 
already close together with differences for social 
words and cognitive words more marked, but 
still well within the ranges. A broad grain such as 
this is unlikely to be revealing. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: How a deceptive article might hide amongst 
scientific articles 
6 Readability and Deception 
Given variation in cues and expectations of 
values for those cues, a question arises of 
whether it is possible to provide some common, 
relatively well understood, and static baseline 
from which it would be possible to consider the 
variations in the values.  Interestingly, various 
cues used in relation to deception also feature in 
Readability research, so might Readability scores 
offer such a baseline for comparison? Daft and 
Lengel (1984) argue that more ambiguous texts 
are more likely to contain deception, and such a 
claim has been supported in relation to fraudulent 
financial reports that contained more complex 
words, while truthful reports attained scores 
indicating better readability (Moffit and Burns 
2009). 
Historically, readability measures have been 
used to indicate the proportion of the population 
that would be able to understand a given text, but 
it has become apparent that word familiarity, 
cognitive load/complexity, cohesion, and other 
features of text contribute to its readability 
(Newbold and Gillam, 2010, Gray and Leary, 
1935) and are also features considered in 
deception research.  
Given the apparent overlap, we consider 
whether we might use readability measures to 
point more reliably to deceptive texts.  Table 2 
shows the cues covered by Gray and Leary 
(1935) for readability which are also studied as 
verbal cues for deception, along with expected 
direction of change in relation to readability and 
to deception (direction for the latter as suggested 
in e.g. Burgoon et al., 2003; Qin, Burgoon & 
Nunamaker, 2004)
 2
. Not only is there an overlap 
with readability, but there seems to be a clear 
suggestion that more difficult texts are more 
likely to be deceptive. 
 Could such a clear relationship hold in 
practice? What would happen with articles such 
as “'Visions link' to coffee intake” or the 100 
scientific abstracts? Scientific texts, and texts 
offering a misrepresentation of or as science, will 
probably both contain Big words, likely Nouns, 
may contain Rare words in contrast to general 
language, and possibly have relatively complex 
sentences. The writing style is also likely to 
impact on pronoun count. So systematic 
differences amongst such values might offer an 
indication of deception. 
 
 Cues R D 
Big words - + 
Nouns - * + 
Verbs * + 
Rare words - + 
Sentence complexity - - 
Number of first person pronouns + -  
Number of second person pronouns + - 
Number of third person pronouns + - 
Average syllables per word and 
sentence 
- + 
* may vary depending of the structure of the 
sentence and the words before and after them 
 
Table 2: Readability features and their relationship to 
Deception 
 
                                                        
2 There are contradictions for expectancy rate for 
these cues so chosen expectations might conflict with 
other theories.  
  
Also, the online version of LIWC has a 
category for Big words (those with more than 6 
letters). The values from this follow a similar 
pattern to that of Grade level for readability. For 
Coffee against 10 Springer articles, dividing Big 
word by Grade level provides the lowest value 
for the Coffee article. So, it is possible – 
indicatively, but not conclusively - that the ratio 
of Big words to Grade level could offer an 
indication. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: How Big words and Grade level tend 
towards indicating each other. 
 
To explore how such a relationship might hold 
in practice, we consider a small experiment 
comparing essentially the same core content, but 
which results in different readability scores. A 
document that has been (supposedly 
equivalently) translated several times, albeit with 
particular variations, offers such a basis, and a 
good example of this is the Bible. We selected 
the Gospel of John (because it contains first 
person pronouns) from the following four 
Bibles
3
; 
 New International Version (NIV) 
 New King James Bible (NKJB)  
 King James Bible (KJM) and 
 New America Standard Bible (NASB) 
We are not suggesting here that the Gospel of 
John is general representative for the English 
language, nor that it should be seen to be 
deceptive per se, but as translations from a single 
source it should help to demonstrate any effect.   
We choose four Pennebaker categories for our 
comparison. Since we have yet to find complete 
lists in Pennebaker’s research, and since 
Newman et al. (2003) does not offer up full lists 
of words, we make use of the list of 86 words 
                                                        
3Accessed from link below for stability in structure 
and sentencing http://www.biblegateway.com  
cited by Little & Skillicorn (2008) as being from 
Pennebaker. If all versions of the Gospel of John 
essentially contain the same content, and if we 
can use these categories for ranking purposes, we 
might expect to either see equal ranks for all four 
cases or to have the old versions (KJM and 
NASB) flagged up with higher ranks of 
deceptiveness.  
Table 3 shows the scores for First Person (FP), 
Negative Words (NW), Exclusive Words (EW) 
and Motion Verbs (MV) as well as Grade Level 
and Reading ease score which shows, in terms of 
readability, NIV and NKJB are the better.  
 
 FP NW EW MV Grade 
Level 
Reading 
ease4 
NIV 1.96 0.24 0.53 0.47 6.48 78.11 
NKJB 3.44 0.12 1.00 0.48 7.24 77.21 
KJB 2.29 0.28 0.69 0.37 7.78 74.48 
NASB 2.04 0.23 0.65 0.44 8.38 73.88 
Newman et al. (2003): Light Gray 
Little and Skillicorn (2008): Dark Gray 
 
Table 3: Variables for Deception and Readability for 
Gospel of John in 4 Bibles 
 
For Newman et al. (2003), the deceptive text 
will have: 
 Decreased frequency of first person 
singular pronouns  NIV 
 Increased frequency of negative emotion 
words  KJB 
 Decreased frequency of exclusive words 
NIV 
 Increased frequency of action verbs 
NKJB, NIV 
On the other hand, Little and Skillicorn (2008) 
expect a deceptive text should show:  
 Increased frequency of first person 
singular pronouns  NKJB 
 Increased frequency of negative emotion 
words  KJB 
 Increased frequency of exclusive words 
NKJB 
 Increased frequency of action verbs 
NKJB, NIV 
                                                        
4 Readability values from: http://www.online-
utility.org/english/readability_test_and_improve.jsp    
  
Interestingly, these results suggest that the New 
International Version (NIV) and New King 
James Bible (NKJB) score higher on deception 
despite both having higher readability values. 
These results contradict what we would expect in 
relation to readability, further underlining the 
difficulty in relying entirely on the existing 
literature and leading us to question whether 
even readability offers gain at this grain.  
7 Further critique 
Analysis and experiments presented above 
suggest that difficulties emerge from present 
considerations of cues of deception – at least in 
relation to verbal deception. However, it is 
unclear whether this is a consequence of how the 
cues are being treated, or whether there are other 
biases which have a telling effect. In much of 
this research, conclusions have tended to be 
drawn on specific datasets, many of which are 
not readily available for inspection or use in 
repeat experiments by others.  
  The datasets were usually collected in one of 
three ways:  
Role Playing: some are asked to deceive 
others (e.g. Hancock et al., 2005; Burgoon et al., 
2003; Qin et al., 2005; Qin, Burgoon & 
Nunamaker, 2004). 
Diary Keeping: individuals are asked to 
document their own interactions (e.g. DePaulo et 
al., 1996; Hancock et al., 2009; Hancock, Thom-
Santelli and Ritchie, 2004). In this type of study, 
participants take time to document, once per day, 
their lies and to self score them based on 
dimensions such as seriousness, feelings while 
lying, and fear of getting caught. 
Obtained as-is: (e.g. Keila, and Skillicorn, 
2005a, b, c). Most such studies adopt 
Pennebaker’s approach. This means that any 
classificatory thresholds have to be manually set 
and evaluated, via the means of the Human 
Eyeball.  
All three approaches suffer from potential 
experimental effects. For the first two, it would 
be important to control for the Hawthorne effect 
which highlights that “observation and studies 
can change the behaviour of the participants” 
regardless of whether they should have really 
changed anything specifically in diary based 
studies (Franke, 1978; Jones, 1992). We believe 
during such studies peoples’ behaviours might 
change, intentionally or otherwise. This might be 
because they become more cautious about 
perceptions of them by the researchers, want to 
avoid fear, shame, and so on, or feel 
uncomfortable with undertaking or documenting 
such an act. Indeed, the researchers may even be 
being deceived about the deceptions by the 
subjects. The third approach leaves the decision 
regarding actual deceptiveness of the text or 
statement open to the possibility that the 
researcher has been “primed by expectations”. 
(Doyen et al., 2012). 
8 Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper has outlined a critical review of 
previous research in deception detection in order 
to assess whether it is possible to create 
deception detection. On present evidence, whilst 
there may be various important findings, there 
are too many areas open to question to believe 
that such a system could readily be constructed. 
We still believe that previous deception 
detection research has a significant role to play, 
but many of the difficulties outlined in this paper 
need to be addressed first. Essentially, this 
requires a more systematic approach towards 
both datasets and treatment of cues. The public 
availability of deception-bearing texts covering 
different text types and genres would offer an 
ideal basis for such an approach, and a similar 
rigour in identifying cues tested, following 
DePaulo, would be highly beneficial. From this, 
it may be possible to identify specific cues as 
worth study in certain genres, whilst of little 
interest in others – irrespective of their relative 
frequency of use. 
In absence of this, in our own near-future 
work we intend to explore the extent to which 
deception cues have also featured in tasks of 
plagiarism detection. Here, the datasets of PAN, 
and in particular as relates to authorship 
attribution and intrinsic plagiarism detection are 
of interest. Since the act of plagiarism is a 
deliberate attempt to deceive, such collections – 
albeit of a synthetic nature - offer us ready 
grounds for repeatable explorations and might 
lead to further insights into the general nature of 
the cues themselves. 
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